[1] Zheng Huili, Da Qingli, Cao Aihong, et al. Research on telecommunication resale service supply chaincoordination with revenue-sharing contract [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2004, 20 (1): 113-116. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2004.01.023]

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Research on telecommunication resale service supply chaincoordination with revenue-sharing contract()

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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

20

Issue:

2004 1

Page:

113-116

Research Field:

Economy and Management

Publishing date:

2004-03-30

Info

Title:

Research on telecommunication resale service supply chaincoordination with revenue-sharing contract

Author(s):

Zheng Huili¹;  2;  Da Qingli¹;  Cao Aihong²

¹College of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
²Department of Management Engineering, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China

Keywords:

telecommunication resale service;  supply chain coordination;  revenue-sharing contract

PACS:

F252;C931

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2004.01.023

Abstract:

The competition and cooperation between traditional telecom operators and resale operators in the supply chain are discussed, when the telecom industry developed telecommunication resale service. Supply chain contract is an effective way to coordinate the supply chain. This paper analyzes the revenue-sharing contract between telecom operators and resale operators. The study shows that by setting up a rational revenue-sharing ratio and wholesale price, a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate this supply chain, and telecom operators and resale operators can achieve a “win-win” solution.

References:

[1] Wu Jichuan. World telecommunication: analysis and thinking [M]. Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2002.(in Chinese)
[2] Chopra Sunil, Meindl Peter. Supply chain manage￣ment: strategy, planning and operation. 2nd ed. [M]. Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2002.(in Chinese)
[3] Cachon Gérard P. Supply chain coordination with contracts [EB/OL]. http: //opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~cachon. 2002/2003-06.
[4] Wang Yingjun. Supply chain management: model￣ing method and data mining [M]. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2001.(in Chinese)
[5] Lariviere M, Cachon G. Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts [J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2001, 3(4): 293-305.
[6] Anupindi R, Bassok Y. Centralization of stocks: retailers vs. manufacturer [J]. Management Science, 1999, 45(2): 178-191.
[7] Lippman S, McCardle K. The competitive newsboy [J]. Operations Research, 1997, 45: 54-65.
[8] Lariviere M, Porteus E. Selling to the newsvendor: an analysis of price-only contracts [J]. Manufacturing and Service Operatious Management, 2001, 3(4): 293-305.
[9] Mortimer J H. The effects of revenue-sharing contracts on welfare in vertically separated markets: evidence from the video rental industry [EB/OL]. http: //post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mortimer/papers/02jmp070.pdf. 2002/2003-06.
[10] Dana J, Spier K. Revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental market [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2001, 49(3): 223-245.
[11] Cachon G, Lariviere M. Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing: strengths and limitations [EB/OL]. http: //opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~cachon. 2002/2003-06.
[12] Corbett C, DeCroix G. Shared savings contracts in supply chains [J]. Management Science, 2001, 47(7): 881-893.

Memo

Memo:

Biographies: Zheng Huili(1964—), female, graduate; Da Qingli(cor￣responding author), male, professor, dql@public1.ppt.js.cn.

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