[1] Zhuang Pin, Zhao Lindu,. Supply chain coordination mechanismsunder asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2007, 23 (4): 620-625. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2007.04.028]
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Supply chain coordination mechanismsunder asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions(
)
非对称信息下零售商成本扰动时供应链协调机制
)Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]
- Volumn:
- 23
- Issue:
- 2007 4
- Page:
- 620-625
- Research Field:
- Economy and Management
- Publishing date:
- 2007-12-30
Info
- Title:
- Supply chain coordination mechanismsunder asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions
- 非对称信息下零售商成本扰动时供应链协调机制
- Author(s):
- Zhuang Pin1; 2; Zhao Lindu1
-
1 Institute of Systems and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
2 College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
- Keywords:
- disruption management; supply chain coordination mechanism; asymmetry information; game theory; cost disruption
- PACS:
- F406.2
- DOI:
- 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2007.04.028
- Abstract:
- A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information(the retailer’s cost structure is asymmetric information)are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios:coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario(without disruption);and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario(with retailer cost disruptions).It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound.This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer’s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound.Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party’s as well as the system’s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.
- 建立市场需求为线性需求, 包含一个供应商和一个零售商的供应链模型, 当零售商成本信息为非对称信息时, 研究2种情形的非对称信息供应链协调机制:正常情形下非对称信息供应链协调机制和零售商成本发生扰动情形下非对称信息供应链协调机制.研究表明, 当零售商成本扰动小于一个阈值时, 供应链系统利用原生产计划可以保证系统稳定运行, 说明原有的协调机制具有一定的鲁棒性;当零售商成本扰动大于一个阈值时, 要对原来的计划进行调整.最后, 通过数值分析研究了零售商成本扰动对订单数量、零售价格、批发价格以及供应链成员和系统期望利润的影响.
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Memo
- Memo:
- Biography: Zhuang Pin(1967—), female, doctor, associate professor, zpnuaa@163.com.