[1] Zhang Qinglei, Yang Jixing, Duan Jianguo, Qin Jiyun, et al. Pricing decision of green supply chainunder the game competition of duopolistic retailers [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2020, 36 (4): 465-474. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.04.012]
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Pricing decision of green supply chainunder the game competition of duopolistic retailers(
)
双寡头零售商博弈竞争下绿色供应链定价决策
)Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]
- Volumn:
- 36
- Issue:
- 2020 4
- Page:
- 465-474
- Research Field:
- Economy and Management
- Publishing date:
- 2020-12-20
Info
- Title:
- Pricing decision of green supply chainunder the game competition of duopolistic retailers
- 双寡头零售商博弈竞争下绿色供应链定价决策
- Author(s):
- Zhang Qinglei; Yang Jixing; Duan Jianguo; Qin Jiyun
- School of Logistics Science and Engineering, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
- PACS:
- F224.32;F274
- DOI:
- 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.04.012
- Abstract:
- In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers, four strategic models among diverse retailers, i.e., Cournot, Stackelberg and two cases of collusion, are constructed. The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis. The results indicate that the manufacturer’s marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers. However, due to the manufacturer’s green cost, the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer’s profitability.The retailers’ Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level. However, there is an opposite result in collusion. Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer’s green sensitivity is higher than a threshold. When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products, retailers prefer collusion, and then choose the Stackelberg behavior. Manufacturers’ profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.
- 为了分析制造商引进绿色生产带来的影响, 研究双寡头零售商之间的竞争决策, 构建了4种零售商策略模型:Cournot、Stackelberg以及2种联合模型.通过博弈论和数值分析得出最优决策.结果表明:制造商的边际利润不小于双寡头零售商边际利润和, 但是由于制造商产品的绿色成本, 供应链下游利润和有超过上游制造商利润的可能;零售商间Cournot行为导致制造商最高的利润和产品最高的绿色水平, 联合行为下最低.当消费者绿色敏感性超过一个阈值零售商会选择Cournot定价;当消费者对产品的价格差敏感性较强时寡头零售商会优先选择联合策略, 其次选择Stackelberg行为.竞争强度的增加有利于制造商的盈利能力, 零售商间适当的竞争有利于彼此双方的利润.
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Memo
- Memo:
-
Biography: Zhang Qinglei(1973—), male, doctor, professor, qlzhang@shmtu.edu.cn.
Foundation items: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51875332), the Capacity Building Projects of Some Local Universities of Shanghai Science and Technology Commission(No.18040501600).
Citation: Zhang Qinglei, Yang Jixing, Duan Jianguo, et al.Pricing decision of green supply chain under the game competition of duopolistic retailers[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2020, 36(4):465-474.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.04.012.