[1] Sun Huan, Wang Haiyan,. Enhancing customers’ prevention efforts:An incentive feedback mechanism design [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2021, 37 (4): 436-444. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2021.04.014]
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Enhancing customers’ prevention efforts:An incentive feedback mechanism design(
)
提升顾客预防努力的激励反馈机制
)Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]
- Volumn:
- 37
- Issue:
- 2021 4
- Page:
- 436-444
- Research Field:
- Economy and Management
- Publishing date:
- 2021-12-20
Info
- Title:
- Enhancing customers’ prevention efforts:An incentive feedback mechanism design
- 提升顾客预防努力的激励反馈机制
- Author(s):
- Sun Huan; Wang Haiyan
- School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
- Keywords:
- customers’ prevention efforts; incentive feedback mechanism; healthcare service; health pricing strategy; health service optimization
- PACS:
- C934
- DOI:
- 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2021.04.014
- Abstract:
- To improve the inefficient prevention caused by customers’ unwillingness to adopt prevention strategies in health management, an incentive feedback mechanism that is based on game theory and contract design theory is introduced. The conditions for making customers and health maintenance organizations(HMOs)willing to participate in the proposed mechanism are given. A dual nonlinear programming model is used to identify the optimal prevention effort of customers and the pricing strategy of HMOs. Results show that to generate increased benefits, HMOs need to consider cost sharing when customers are not familiar with the proposed health services. When health services are gradually accepted, the cost sharing factor can be gradually reduced. Simulation shows that under random circumstances in which the market reaches a certain size, the proposed method exhibits a positive network externality. Motivated by network externality, HMOs only need to make their customers understand that the larger the number of participants, the greater the utility of each person. Such customers may then spontaneously invite others to purchase insurance.
- 为了改进健康管理中由于顾客不愿努力而造成的预防效率低的情形, 引入了基于博弈论和合同设计理论的激励反馈机制, 以提高顾客的预防积极性.给出了使得顾客和健康维护组织都愿意参与该机制的条件.通过非线性规划模型获得了顾客的最佳预防努力和健康维护组织的价格策略.结果表明:要产生更大的收益, 健康维护组织需要在顾客不熟悉健康服务时增加成本共担系数, 以激励顾客进行预防努力;当健康服务逐渐被接受以后, 成本共担系数可以逐渐减小.仿真表明, 在随机环境下, 当市场达到一定规模后, 所提方法具有积极的网络外部性.受到网络外部性的影响, 健康维护组织只需要使得顾客了解参与人越多, 每个人获得的效用越大, 顾客就可能自发邀请朋友购买保险.
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Memo
- Memo:
-
Biographies: Sun Huan(1990—), male, Ph.D. candidate; Wang Haiyan(corresponding author), male, doctor, professor, hywang@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No. 71531004, 72071042).
Citation: Sun Huan, Wang Haiyan. Enhancing customers’ prevention efforts: An incentive feedback mechanism design[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2021, 37(4):436-444.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2021.04.014.