[1] Mu Yurong, Zhong Weijun, Mei Shue, et al. Pricing strategy selection for content platformsconsidering cash subsidies [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2024, 40 (1): 105-110. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2024.01.012]

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Pricing strategy selection for content platformsconsidering cash subsidies()

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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

40

Issue:

2024 1

Page:

105-110

Research Field:

Economy and Management

Publishing date:

2024-03-20

Info

Title:

Pricing strategy selection for content platformsconsidering cash subsidies

Author(s):

Mu Yurong¹;  2;  Zhong Weijun¹;  Mei Shu’e¹;  Zhang Yuxiang¹

¹School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
²School of Network Security and Information Technology, Yili Normal University, Yining 835000, China

Keywords:

content platform;  pricing strategy;  choice;  charge;  free;  cash subsidy

PACS:

C934

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2024.01.012

Abstract:

Three pricing strategy models—free, charge, and cash subsidy—are constructed for content platforms in a multilateral market based on the game theory. The optimal pricing strategy for a platform is identified by comparing the parameters under each pricing strategy. The results reveal that ad interference cost and ad marginal revenue affect a platform’s pricing strategy selection and the cash subsidy amount. The cash subsidy strategy is used when both are within a certain range of thresholds; the charge strategy is adopted when the ad interference cost is very high; and the free strategy is adopted in other cases. In addition, under the cash subsidy strategy, the amount of cash subsidy is negatively correlated to ad interference cost and positively related to ad marginal revenue. Under the same conditions, adopting the cash subsidy strategy is better for all stakeholders and social welfare than the other two pricing schemes. Moreover, ad marginal revenue affects some parameters in the cash subsidy strategy and the free strategy in opposite directions.

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Memo

Memo:

Biographies: Mu Yurong(1988—), female, Ph.D. candidate; Zhong Weijun(corresponding author), male, doctor, professor, zhongweijun@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation items: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72371069, 71871054).
Citation: Mu Yurong, Zhong Weijun, Mei Shu’e, et al. Pricing strategy selection for content platforms considering cash subsidies[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2024, 40(1):105-110.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2024.01.012.

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