[1] ZHOU Jianan, ZHONG Weijun, MEI Shue,. Invitational bidding and award strategies for technological innovation of public goods: A contest model analysis [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2026, 42 (2): 240-249. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2026.02.011]
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Invitational bidding and award strategies for technological innovation of public goods: A contest model analysis(
)
公共产品技术创新邀请招标与奖金策略——基于竞赛模型的分析
)Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]
- Volumn:
- 42
- Issue:
- 2026 2
- Page:
- 240-249
- Research Field:
- Publishing date:
- 2026-05-29
Info
- Title:
- Invitational bidding and award strategies for technological innovation of public goods: A contest model analysis
- 公共产品技术创新邀请招标与奖金策略——基于竞赛模型的分析
- Author(s):
- ZHOU Jianan, ZHONG Weijun, MEI Shu’e
- School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
- Keywords:
- technological innovation of public goods; invitational bidding; contest model; procurement contract; award strategy
- PACS:
- G304
- DOI:
- 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2026.02.011
- Abstract:
- Invitational bidding is key to encouraging enterprise participation in the technological innovation of public goods. This study develops a contest model that incorporates supplier type (independent or public sector-affiliated), heterogeneous innovation capabilities, and project-specific technical risks. Using limiting-case analysis, we compare two invitational bidding strategies on innovation and efficiency of benefits: inviting only independent suppliers and inviting both independent and affiliated suppliers. We also identify the boundary conditions under which long-term contracts lower the public sector’s obligatory award budget. The key findings are as follows: Competition is strengthened when technically strong independent suppliers bid alongside affiliated suppliers; however, competition weakens when independent suppliers lack technical strength. Long-term supply contracts may not necessarily enhance competition and may diminish suppliers’ motivation for technological innovation. Innovation and benefit improvement are rarely achieved simultaneously. Both goals can be achieved only when independent suppliers have clear technical advantages, making it optimal for the public sector to invite both independent and affiliated suppliers to bid. When innovation projects involve high technical risks or independent suppliers demonstrate strong innovation capabilities, the public sector may reduce the award budget using long-term contracts as incentives to successfully motivate suppliers.
- 邀请招标是推动企业参与公共产品技术创新的重要机制。基于供应商隶属关系(独立或隶属于公共部门),并结合其创新能力的异质性与创新项目的技术风险,构建竞赛模型,从创新产出和效益水平2个维度,运用极限分析方法比较2种邀标策略:一是公共部门仅邀请独立供应商竞标,二是同时邀请独立供应商与附属供应商竞标。此外,进一步探讨了长期合同降低公共部门奖金预算的边界条件。结果表明:邀请具有显著技术优势的独立供应商与附属供应商共同参与竞标,可有效激发竞争;反之,若独立供应商技术实力不足,其参与可能反而削弱市场竞争效果。预先承诺长期供应合同未必能增强竞争,反而可能削弱供应商技术创新的动力。促进创新与提升效益通常难以同步实现,只有在独立供应商拥有明显技术优势的情况下,公共部门采用独立与附属供应商竞标的策略,才能同时兼顾二者目标。当创新项目存在较高的技术风险,或独立供应商具备较强创新能力时,公共部门可依据长期合同所发挥的激励作用,适当降低奖金预算,以更有效地激励供应商。
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Memo
- Memo:
-
Received: 2025-03-20; Revised: 2025-12-12.
Biographies: ZHOU Jianan (1994—), male, Ph.D.candidate; ZHONG Weijun (corresponding author), male, doctor, professor, zhongweijun@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The National Key Research and Development Program of China (No.2023YFC3804901).
Citation: ZHOU Jianan, ZHONG Weijun, MEI Shu’e. Invitational bidding and award strategies for technological innovation of public goods: A contest model analysis[J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2026, 42(2): 240-249. DOI: 10. 3969/j. issn. 1003-7985. 2026. 02. 011.