[1] Lin Yi-Hsin, Ho Shih-Ping, Wu Hsueh-Liang,. Antecedents and performance consequencesof governance structures in R&D alliances [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2012, 28 (3): 360-366. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2012.03.019]

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Antecedents and performance consequencesof governance structures in R&D alliances()

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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

28

Issue:

2012 3

Page:

360-366

Research Field:

Economy and Management

Publishing date:

2012-09-30

Info

Title:

Antecedents and performance consequencesof governance structures in R&D alliances

Author(s):

Lin Yi-Hsin¹;  Ho Shih-Ping²;  Wu Hsueh-Liang³

¹School of Civil Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
²Department of Civil Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei 10672, China
³Department of International Business, National Taiwan Uni

Keywords:

organizational governance structure;  organizational control;  resource-based review;  transaction cost economics;  R&;  D alliance

PACS:

N36

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2012.03.019

Abstract:

Traditionally governance structures are classified into “hierarchy or market” or “equity or non-equity.” However, such classifications may not be effective in characterizing all governance structures of research and development(R&〓 D)alliances. Therefore, the first objective of this study is to investigate why there exist different organizational governance structures in managing R&〓 D alliances; the second objective of this study is to give strategic advice in choosing appropriate forms with respect to various characteristics of R&〓 D alliances. Through the theoretical lens that integrate both transaction cost economics(TCE)and the resource-based view(RBV), a model that focuses on six major factors is developed for determining governance structure choices, namely, technological uncertainty, cultural difference, asset specificity, technology complementarity, appropriability of the individual firm’s know-how, and trust. An R&〓 D alliance with higher technological uncertainty, larger cultural differences, and greater concerns for protecting an individual’s know-how is more likely to adopt non-integrated alliances as the governing structure. An R&〓 D alliance with a higher degree of asset-specificity, greater technology complementarity and greater trust among partnering organizations is more likely to adopt integrated alliances as the governing structure; an R&〓 D alliance in the face of lower technological uncertainty will tend to adopt integrated alliances. The more aligned the choice of the governance structure with its determinants, the better the R&〓 D alliance will perform, and vice versa.

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Memo

Memo:

Biography: Lin Yi-Hsin(1969—), female, doctor, associate professor, yihsinlin@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions.
Citation: Lin Yi-Hsin, Ho Shih-Ping, Wu Hsueh-Liang. Antecedents and performance consequences of governance structures in R& D alliances[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2012, 28(3):360-366.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2012.03.019]

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