[1] Lin Guoying, Feng Xiaofeng, Lu Shixiang, et al. Revenue optimization strategy of V2G based on evolutionary game [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2020, 36 (1): 50-55. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.01.007]

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Revenue optimization strategy of V2G based on evolutionary game()

基于演化博弈的V2G收益优化策略

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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

36

Issue:

2020 1

Page:

50-55

Research Field:

Electrical Engineering

Publishing date:

2020-03-20

Info

Title:

Revenue optimization strategy of V2G based on evolutionary game

基于演化博弈的V2G收益优化策略

Author(s):

Lin Guoying¹;  2;  Feng Xiaofeng²;  Lu Shixiang²

¹College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310000, China
²Guangdong Power Grid Corporation, Guangzhou 510080, China

林国营¹;  2;  冯小峰²;  卢世祥²

¹浙江大学电气工程学院, 杭州 310000; ²广东电力公司, 广州 510080

Keywords:

evolutionary game;  electric vehicle;  vehicle-to-grid;  electricity price

演化博弈;  电动汽车;  车联网(V2G);  电价

PACS:

TM732

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.01.007

Abstract:

In order to protect the interests of electric vehicle users and grid companies with vehicle-to-grid(V2G)technology, a reasonable electric vehicle discharge electricity price is established through the evolutionary game model. A game model of power grid companies and electric vehicle users based on the evolutionary game theory is established to balance the revenue of both players in the game. By studying the dynamic evolution process of both sides of the game, the range of discharge price that satisfies the interests of both sides is obtained. The results are compared with those obtained by the static Bayesian game. The results show that the discharge price which can benefit both sides of the game exists in a specific range. According to the setting of the example, the reasonable discharge electricity price is 1.106 0 to 1.481 1 yuan/(kW·h). Only within this range can the power grid company and electric vehicle users achieve positive interactions. In addition, the evolutionary game model is easier to balance the interests of the two players than the static Bayesian game.

为了保障车联网(V2G)技术下的电动汽车用户利益和电网公司收益, 通过演化博弈模型制定合理的电动汽车放电电价.以博弈双方收益平衡为目标, 建立了基于演化博弈理论的电网公司和电动汽车用户的博弈模型.通过研究博弈双方的动态演化过程, 得出可以满足双方利益的电动汽车放电电价的范围, 并且与静态博弈获得的结果进行对比.算例结果表明可以使博弈双方共同受益的放电价格仅存在于特定范围内.根据本算例设定, 合理的放电电价是1.106 0~1.481 1元/(kW·h), 只有在该范围内电网公司和电动车用户才能实现积极的互动.此外, 演化博弈比静态博弈更容易促成博弈双方收益平衡.

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Memo

Memo:

Biography: Lin Guoying(1982—), male, doctor, senior engineer, yetqmwei@163.com.
Foundation item: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51577028).
Citation: Lin Guoying, Feng Xiaofeng, Lu Shixiang.Revenue optimization strategy of V2G based on evolutionary game[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2020, 36(1):50-55.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.01.007.

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