[1] Zhang Qinglei, Yang Jixing, Duan Jianguo, Qin Jiyun, et al. Pricing decision of green supply chainunder the game competition of duopolistic retailers [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2020, 36 (4): 465-474. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.04.012]

Copy

Pricing decision of green supply chainunder the game competition of duopolistic retailers()

Share：

Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

36

Issue:

2020 4

Page:

465-474

Research Field:

Economy and Management

Publishing date:

2020-12-20

Info

Title:

Pricing decision of green supply chainunder the game competition of duopolistic retailers

Author(s):

Zhang Qinglei;  Yang Jixing;  Duan Jianguo;  Qin Jiyun

School of Logistics Science and Engineering, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China

Keywords:

green supply chain;  duopolistic retailers;  competitive strategy;  game theory

PACS:

F224.32;F274

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.04.012

Abstract:

In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers, four strategic models among diverse retailers, i.e., Cournot, Stackelberg and two cases of collusion, are constructed. The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis. The results indicate that the manufacturer’s marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers. However, due to the manufacturer’s green cost, the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer’s profitability.The retailers’ Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level. However, there is an opposite result in collusion. Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer’s green sensitivity is higher than a threshold. When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products, retailers prefer collusion, and then choose the Stackelberg behavior. Manufacturers’ profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.

References:

[1] Wang Y, Hou G S. A duopoly game with heterogeneous green supply chains in optimal price and market stability with consumer green preference[J].Journal of Cleaner Production, 2020, 255: 120161. DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120161.
[2] Hong Z F, Guo X L. Green product supply chain contracts considering environmental responsibilities[J].Omega, 2019, 83: 155-166. DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2018.02.010.
[3] Sheu J B, Chou Y H, Hu C C. An integrated logistics operational model for green-supply chain management[J].Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2005, 41(4): 287-313. DOI:10.1016/j.tre.2004.07.001.
[4] Zhao R, Neighbour G, Han J J, et al. Using game theory to describe strategy selection for environmental risk and carbon emissions reduction in the green supply chain[J].Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2012, 25(6): 927-936. DOI:10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.004.
[5] Xu L, Dong M, Chen J. The selection of subsidy objects in duopoly competition [J]. Journal of Systems Management, 2018, 27(5): 961-70.(in Chinese)
[6] Yang H X, Miao L Y, Zhao C. The credit strategy of a green supply chain based on capital constraints[J].Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 224: 930-939. DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.03.214.
[7] Song H H, Gao X X. Green supply chain game model and analysis under revenue-sharing contract[J].Journal of Cleaner Production, 2018, 170: 183-192. DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.09.138.
[8] Li T, Zhang R, Zhao S L, et al. Low carbon strategy analysis under revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts[J].Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 212: 1462-1477. DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.11.282.
[9] Seyedhosseini S M, Hosseini-Motlagh S M, Johari M, et al. Social price-sensitivity of demand for competitive supply chain coordination[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2019, 135: 1103-1126. DOI:10.1016/j.cie.2019.05.019.
[10] Modak N M, Panda S, Sana S S. Three-echelon supply chain coordination considering duopolistic retailers with perfect quality products[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 182: 564-578. DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.05.021.
[11] Hosseini-Motlagh S M, Nematollahi M, Johari M, et al. A collaborative model for coordination of monopolistic manufacturer’s promotional efforts and competing duopolistic retailers’ trade credits[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2018, 204: 108-122. DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.07.027.
[12] Xu L, Shi X R, Du P, et al. Optimization on pricing and overconfidence problem in a duopolistic supply chain[J]. Computers & Operations Research, 2019, 101: 162-172. DOI:10.1016/j.cor.2018.04.003.
[13] Qi Q, Wang J, Bai Q G. Pricing decision of a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and two retailers under a carbon cap regulation[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017, 151: 286-302. DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.03.011.
[14] Yang H L, Zhuo W Y, Shao L S. Equilibrium evolution in a two-echelon supply chain with financially constrained retailers: The impact of equity financing[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 185: 139-149. DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.12.027.
[15] Anderson E J, Bao Y. Price competition with integrated and decentralized supply chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 200(1): 227-234. DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.11.049.
[16] Zhang L H, Wang J G, You J X. Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2015, 241(1): 63-73. DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.043.
[17] Huang H, Ke H, Wang L. Equilibrium analysis of pricing competition and cooperation in supply chain with one common manufacturer and duopoly retailers[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 178: 12-21. DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.04.022.
[18] Chen X, Luo Z, Wang X J. Compete or cooperate: Intensity, dynamics, and optimal strategies[J]. Omega, 2019, 86: 76-86. DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2018.07.002.

Memo

Memo:

Biography: Zhang Qinglei(1973—), male, doctor, professor, qlzhang@shmtu.edu.cn.
Foundation items: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51875332), the Capacity Building Projects of Some Local Universities of Shanghai Science and Technology Commission(No.18040501600).
Citation: Zhang Qinglei, Yang Jixing, Duan Jianguo, et al.Pricing decision of green supply chain under the game competition of duopolistic retailers[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2020, 36(4):465-474.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2020.04.012.

Common functions