[1] HE Yongming, TONG Xin, RAN Bin, LIANG Chen, et al. Research on game strategies of participants in highway prevention and noise pollution control [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2026, 42 (1): 80-91. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2026.01.008]

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Research on game strategies of participants in highway prevention and noise pollution control()

高速公路噪声防治参与主体博弈策略研究

Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

42

Issue:

2026 1

Page:

80-91

Research Field:

Traffic and Transportation Engineering

Publishing date:

2026-03-20

Info

Title:

Research on game strategies of participants in highway prevention and noise pollution control

高速公路噪声防治参与主体博弈策略研究

Author(s):

HE Yongming^1,2, TONG Xin¹, RAN Bin^3,4, LIANG Chen¹, WAN Yiming¹

1.College of Civil Engineering and Transportation, Northeast Forestry University, Harbin 150006, China
2.National Key Laboratory of Green and Long-Life Road Engineering in Extreme Environment, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China
3.Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison 57305, USA
4.School of Transportation, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China

何永明^1,2, 佟鑫¹, 冉斌^3,4, 梁晨¹, 万祎明¹

1.东北林业大学土木与交通学院, 哈尔滨 150006
2.长沙理工大学极端环境绿色长寿道路工程全国重点实验室, 长沙 410114
3.Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison 57305, USA
4.东南大学交通学院, 南京 211189

Keywords:

noise prevention and control;  operational period;  evolutionary game;  Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway Lituo sinking section

噪声防治;  运营期;  演化博弈;  京港澳高速黎托下沉段

PACS:

U491.7

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2026.01.008

Abstract:

To uncover the decision-making mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of multiple stakeholders in highway noise pollution control, a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government, operators, and the public is constructed. The operation period is divided into different stages for differentiated analysis. A simulation analysis was performed on the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway to assess the impact of variations in critical elements on the system.The results indicate that the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway is currently in its early stage of development, with the corresponding strategies being active regulation, excessive emissions, and supervision. When the cost of the government’s active regulation decreases from 1×10⁵ to 5×10⁴ yuan, the system converges more rapidly toward the active regulation strategy. When the cost of the operator’s excessive emissions increases from 14.08×10⁶ to 20.00×10⁶ yuan, the system drives the operator toward the standardized emission strategy. In addition, when the cost of public supervision decreases from 15×10⁴ to 5×10⁴ yuan and the compensation paid by operators to the public increases from 1.288×10⁶ to 2.576×10⁶ yuan, the system converges more quickly toward the supervision strategy. The cost of the operator’s excessive emissions serves as the core decision variable for achieving the ideal equilibrium in the three-party game involving government active regulation, operator standardized emissions, and public supervision.

为揭示高速公路噪声污染治理中多主体决策逻辑与系统演化规律,基于演化博弈理论构建政府、运营商、公众三方博弈模型,并将运营期划分为不同阶段进行差异化分析。以京港澳高速公路黎托段为例,评估关键要素变化对系统的影响。结果表明,京港澳高速公路黎托沉陷段处于发展初期,对应策略包括主动监管、超标排放和监督。当政府主动监管成本从10万元降到5万元时,系统以更快的速度收敛于主动监管策略。当运营商超标排放成本从1 408万元增加到2 000万元时,系统迫使运营商选择达标排放策略。此外,当公众监督成本从15万元降至5万元,且运营商对公众的赔偿从128.8万元增至257.6万元时,系统以更快的速度收敛于监督策略。运营商超标排放成本是实现政府积极监管-运营商规范排放-公众监督三方博弈理想均衡的核心决策变量。

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Memo

Memo:

Received: 2025-07-07; Revised: 2025-09-26.
Biography: HE Yongming (1979—), male, doctor, associate professor, hymjob@nefu.edu.cn.
Foundation items: The Natural Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province (No.LH2023E011), Open Fund of National Key Laboratory of Green and Long-Life Road Engineering in Extreme Environment in Changsha University of Science and Technology (No.kfj230105).
Citation: HE Yongming, TONG Xin, RAN Bin, et al. Research on game strategies of participants in highway prevention and noise pollution control[J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2026, 42(1): 80-91. DOI: 10. 3969/j. issn. 1003-7985. 2026. 01. 008.

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