|Table of Contents|

[1] BIAN Bei, WANG Haiyan,. Monetizing game resale: Strategic pricing for digital platforms [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2026, 42 (3): 397-405. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2026.03.012]
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Monetizing game resale: Strategic pricing for digital platforms()
数字游戏二手交易的货币化:平台战略定价分析

Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:
42
Issue:
2026 3
Page:
397-405
Research Field:
Economy and Management
Publishing date:
2026-09-06

Info

Title:
Monetizing game resale: Strategic pricing for digital platforms
数字游戏二手交易的货币化:平台战略定价分析
Author(s):
BIAN Bei, WANG Haiyan
School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
卞贝, 王海燕
东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 211189
Keywords:
game resale;  dynamic pricing;  mode selection;  strategic users
游戏二手交易;  动态定价;  模式选择;  战略消费者
PACS:
C934
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2026.03.012
Abstract:
Digital game platforms have flexible resale permissions and dynamic pricing. A dynamic pricing model with diverse user preferences and two-stage purchase behaviors is developed. Optimal strategies and market equilibria are compared under the resale-prohibited and resale-permitted modes. The results show that resale prohibition shifts platforms’ focus from market penetration to profit maximization due to higher utility from delayed consumption. Under resale permission, platforms can set high prices for user resale or offer resale inventory at moderate prices. The operational modes are adjusted dynamically based on users’ initial usage and resale valuation. When the user utility is low, resale expands market coverage. When the initial usage is high and the resale potential is low, margins can be protected by prohibiting resale. If the overall purchase intent is strong, both modes yield substantial returns. Games with lower initial usage value achieve broader early participation and higher profit, whereas high-enthusiasm games exhibit sharper segmentation.
数字游戏平台在二手交易权限和动态定价方面具有更大灵活性。本文构建了一种包含异质偏好和二阶段购买行为的动态定价模型,对比了禁止与允许二手交易下的平台最优策略与市场均衡。结果表明,在禁止二手交易模式下,延迟消费效用的增加促使平台从市场渗透转向利润最大化。允许二手交易时,平台可能通过高价引导用户转售,或以适中定价策略提供二手库存。平台应依据用户初始使用和二手交易潜力动态调整模式。效用较低时,允许二手交易来提高市场覆盖;初始效用较高但二手潜力较低时,禁止二手交易可保护利润;整体购买意愿较强时,2种模式均能带来回报。低初始使用价值的游戏更易获得早期参与和更高的利润;高热度游戏则呈现更明显的用户分化。

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Memo

Memo:
Received: 2025-05-27; Revised: 2025-12-04.
Biographies: BIAN Bei (1996—), female, Ph.D.candidate; WANG Haiyan (corresponding author), male, doctor, professor, hywang@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation items: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.72571060, 72071042).
Citation: BIAN Bei, WANG Haiyan. Monetizing game resale: Strategic pricing for digital platforms[J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2026, 42(3): 397-405. DOI: 10. 3969/j. issn. 1003-7985. 2026. 03. 012.
Last Update: 2026-09-20