[1] Xiong Qiang, Zhong Weijun, Mei Shue, et al. Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcingbased on principal-agent model [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2014, 30 (1): 113-117. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2014.01.021]

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Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcingbased on principal-agent model()

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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

30

Issue:

2014 1

Page:

113-117

Research Field:

Economy and Management

Publishing date:

2014-03-31

Info

Title:

Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcingbased on principal-agent model

Author(s):

Xiong Qiang¹;  2;  Zhong Weijun¹;  Mei Shu’e¹

¹School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
²School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China

Keywords:

principal agent;  information security outsourcing;  incentive mechanism

PACS:

F270

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2014.01.021

Abstract:

In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.

References:

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Memo

Memo:

Biographies: Xiong Qiang(1979—), male, graduate; Zhong Weijun(corresponding author), male, doctor, professor, zhongweijun@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation items: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71071033), the Youth Foundation of Humanity and Social Science of Ministry of Education of China(No.11YJC630234).
Citation: Xiong Qiang, Zhong Weijun, Mei Shu’e.Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model.[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2014, 30(1):113-117.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2014.01.021]

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