|Table of Contents|

[1] Yu Wei, Han Ruizhu,. Effect of contract choice on upstream carbon emission reductionconsidering carbon taxation [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2019, 35 (1): 135-141. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.01.019]

Effect of contract choice on upstream carbon emission reductionconsidering carbon taxation()

Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

2019 1
Research Field:
Economy and Management
Publishing date:


Effect of contract choice on upstream carbon emission reductionconsidering carbon taxation
Yu Wei Han Ruizhu
School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
carbon taxation wholesale price contract cost-sharing contract revenue-sharing contract first-mover advantage
In order to curb the manufacturer’s product carbon emission levels, the leading retailer usually offers three contracts to the manufacturer, i.e., wholesale-price contract(WC), cost-sharing contract(CC)and revenue-sharing contract(RC). The results of implementing the three contracts are discussed and compared. The results reveal that as long as the government levies carbon taxations, all the three contracts can effectively stimulate the manufacturer to invest in carbon emission reduction. Among the three contracts, RC can achieve the highest level of carbon emission reduction of products and the maximum profits for both the manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain. However, the RC fails to reach the level of the centralized supply chain(CSC), thus it cannot coordinate the supply chain. The supply chain members’ contract choices are consistent. Both members prefer RC to the other two contracts. In order to effectively reduce the manufacturer’s carbon emission levels, the government should impose the highest carbon taxation level under RC, the medium carbon taxation level under CC, the lowest carbon taxation level under WC, and the same carbon taxation level as RC under the CSC.


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Biographies: Yu Wei(1977—), male, Ph.D. candidate; Han Ruizhu(corresponding author), female, doctor, professor, rzhan@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71531004).
Citation: Yu Wei, Han Ruizhu.Effect of contract choice on upstream carbon emission reduction considering carbon taxation[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2019, 35(1):135-141.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.01.019.
Last Update: 2019-03-20