[1] Jia Dongfeng, Li Sijie,. Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competitionwith product quality differentiation and secondhand market [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2019, 35 (4): 516-521. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.04.015]
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Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competitionwith product quality differentiation and secondhand market(
)
)Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]
- Volumn:
- 35
- Issue:
- 2019 4
- Page:
- 516-521
- Research Field:
- Economy and Management
- Publishing date:
- 2019-12-30
Info
- Title:
- Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competitionwith product quality differentiation and secondhand market
- Author(s):
- Jia Dongfeng; Li Sijie
- School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
- PACS:
- C931
- DOI:
- 10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.04.015
- Abstract:
- Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program, the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Nash game, and the impacts of the trade-in program from the perspectives of the demands, profits, marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are investigated. It finds that the trade-in program has different impacts when it is implemented by different manufacturers. When the low-quality manufacturer implements the program, it is always beneficial to himself and consumers but harmful to the high-quality manufacturer. However, when the program is implemented by the high-quality manufacturer, it can be beneficial to the low-quality manufacturer as well as to the implementer but harmful to consumers if the transaction cost of the consumer selling the used product in the secondhand market is low enough. Furthermore, with the increase in transaction cost, it also becomes harmful to the low-quality manufacturer and beneficial to consumers, which is the same as in the case that the low-quality manufacturer implements the trade-in program. The impacts of related parameters on the demands, marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are also analyzed.
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Memo
- Memo:
-
Biographies: Jia Dongfeng(1989—), male, Ph. D. candidate; Li Sijie(corresponding author), male, doctor, associate professor, sjli@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71871058, 71531010).
Citation: Jia Dongfeng, Li Sijie.Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competition with product quality differentiation and secondhand market[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2019, 35(4):516-521.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.04.015.