[1] Zhang Wei, Zhong Weijun, Mei Shue, et al. R&D subsidy policy of domestic firmconsidering foreign firm competition [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2016, 32 (4): 513-519. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2016.04.020]

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R&D subsidy policy of domestic firmconsidering foreign firm competition()

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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:

32

Issue:

2016 4

Page:

513-519

Research Field:

Economy and Management

Publishing date:

2016-12-20

Info

Title:

R&D subsidy policy of domestic firmconsidering foreign firm competition

Author(s):

Zhang Wei¹;  2;  Zhong Weijun¹;  Mei Shu’e¹

¹School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
²School of Statistics and Applied Mathematics, Anhui University of Finance and Economics, Bengbu 233030, China

Keywords:

research and development(R&;  D)investment;  investment subsidy;  product subsidy;  technology gap;  foreign firm competition

PACS:

F224

DOI:

10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2016.04.020

Abstract:

Taking the advanced technology of the foreign firm into account, a mixed duopoly three-stage game model is established in the context of research and development(R&D)investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms provided by the government, and the R&D subsidy policy of domestic firms in competition with foreign firms is analyzed. The equilibrium output, R&D investment of the domestic firm, social welfare and the value of government subsidies are derived, in the case of the two policies, R&D investment subsidies and product subsidies for domestic firms, provided by the government. The results show that, the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the R&D investment subsidy policy are both less than those under the product subsidy policy; the optimal R&D investment under the R&D investment subsidy policy is less than that under the product subsidy policy; and the R&D product subsidy has a more obvious incentive effect on firm R&D investment. Under the background of the leading edge of technology of foreign firms, the product subsidy policy drawn up by the government to encourage R&D innovation of domestic firms is more effective than the R&D investment subsidy policy.

References:

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Memo

Memo:

Biographies: Zhang Wei(1982—), male, graduate; Zhong Weijun(corresponding author), male, doctor, professor, zhongweijun@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The Special Project of Innovative Methods and Work Funded by Ministry of National Science and Technology of China(No.2013IM030600).
Citation: Zhang Wei, Zhong Weijun, Mei Shu’e. R& D subsidy policy of domestic firm considering foreign firm competition[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2016, 32(4):513-519.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2016.04.020.

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