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[1] Jia Dongfeng, Li Sijie,. Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competitionwith product quality differentiation and secondhand market [J]. Journal of Southeast University (English Edition), 2019, 35 (4): 516-521. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.04.015]
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Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competitionwith product quality differentiation and secondhand market()
考虑产品质量差异和二手市场时 以旧换新对双寡头竞争的影响
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Journal of Southeast University (English Edition)[ISSN:1003-7985/CN:32-1325/N]

Volumn:
35
Issue:
2019 4
Page:
516-521
Research Field:
Economy and Management
Publishing date:
2019-12-30

Info

Title:
Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competitionwith product quality differentiation and secondhand market
考虑产品质量差异和二手市场时 以旧换新对双寡头竞争的影响
Author(s):
Jia Dongfeng Li Sijie
School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
贾东峰 李四杰
东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 211189
Keywords:
trade-in program quality differentiation duopoly competition Nash game
以旧换新 质量差异 双寡头竞争 Nash 博弈
PACS:
C931
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.04.015
Abstract:
Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program, the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Nash game, and the impacts of the trade-in program from the perspectives of the demands, profits, marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are investigated. It finds that the trade-in program has different impacts when it is implemented by different manufacturers. When the low-quality manufacturer implements the program, it is always beneficial to himself and consumers but harmful to the high-quality manufacturer. However, when the program is implemented by the high-quality manufacturer, it can be beneficial to the low-quality manufacturer as well as to the implementer but harmful to consumers if the transaction cost of the consumer selling the used product in the secondhand market is low enough. Furthermore, with the increase in transaction cost, it also becomes harmful to the low-quality manufacturer and beneficial to consumers, which is the same as in the case that the low-quality manufacturer implements the trade-in program. The impacts of related parameters on the demands, marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are also analyzed.
考虑二手市场的存在及以旧换新的实施, 利用Nash博弈构建了生产不同质量产品的两制造商竞争模型, 并从制造商利润、边际利润、产品需求以及消费者净成本4个方面研究了以旧换新的影响.研究发现当以旧换新由不同的制造商实施时, 其产生的影响是不同的.当低质量产品制造商实施时, 以旧换新总是有益于实施者和消费者, 但有害于高质量制造商.当高质量产品制造商实施以旧换新时, 如果消费者在二手市场出售旧产品的交易费用较低时, 以旧换新将有益于实施者和低质量制造商, 但有害于消费者; 随着交易费的升高, 它变得同样有害于低质量制造商但有益于消费者.此外, 还分析了相关参数对制造商边际利润、产品需求及消费者净成本的影响.

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Memo

Memo:
Biographies: Jia Dongfeng(1989—), male, Ph. D. candidate; Li Sijie(corresponding author), male, doctor, associate professor, sjli@seu.edu.cn.
Foundation item: The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71871058, 71531010).
Citation: Jia Dongfeng, Li Sijie.Impacts of trade-in program on duopoly competition with product quality differentiation and secondhand market[J].Journal of Southeast University(English Edition), 2019, 35(4):516-521.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-7985.2019.04.015.
Last Update: 2019-12-20